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Abstract
To what extent does “false science” impact the rate and direction of scientific change? We
examine the impact of over 1,100 scientific retractions on the citation trajectories of articles that
are related to retracted papers in intellectual space but were published prior to the retraction
event. Following retraction and relative to carefully selected controls, related articles experience
a lasting five to ten percent decline in the rate of citations received. This penalty is more
severe when the retracted article involves fraud or misconduct, rather than honest mistakes.
In addition, we find that the arrival rate of new articles and funding flows into these fields
decrease after a retraction.
Keywords: economics of science, scientific misconduct, retractions, status.
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1 Introduction
In 2005, South Korean scientist Woo-Suk Hwang and his colleagues published an article in
Science claiming they had isolated embryonic stem cells from a cloned human embryo via
nuclear transfer (Hwang et al. 2005). Immediately following publication, scientists around
the world took time and resources to replicate and continue this line of enquiry, thus building
on the exciting (albeit controversial) field of human embryonic stem cell production using
cloning. Less than a year later, the paper was formally retracted from the literature amidst
claims of error and later findings of fraud and embezzlement. In the aftermath, the govern-
ment of South Korea curtailed investment in stem cell research for five years and, globally,
scientists no longer built on the fraudulent Hwang paper; some researchers abandoned the
field altogether while others pursued adjacent research lines that built on firmer foundations
(Furman, Murray, and Stern 2012). It took several years before researchers started to explore
some of the novel hESC production methods proposed in the controversial paper, particu-
larly parthenogenesis. In late 2007 Harvard researchers published definitive results showing
that some of the (lesser) claims made by the Korean team were actually useful insights into
other methods of hESC production (Kim et al. 2007). Until this new research, the field
had been stifled because the retracted paper “sent a lot of scientists on a wild goose chase
and down false paths,” in the words of a stem cell researcher, Robert Lanza, quoted by the
Associated Press (2005).
1
	
				


469
 
!"

##$
%%&'(")"*%%
+
# 
	 
,#
'
	 #%+
This dramatic incident illustrates the central questions of our paper: To what extent
does “false science” impact the rate and direction of scientific research? To address this
question we examine the impact of retractions — publications in the academic literature
that are withdrawn by authors or editors — on cumulative knowledge production along
retracted research lines. We do so using a novel approach to characterize the intellectual
scope of research fields and their proximity to specific (retracted) papers. Our analysis
is timely because “false science” — a term we use to cover a broad range of phenomena,
from mistakes to plagiarism to difficulties in replication to systematic fraud — has received
considerable recent attention (Fang, Steen, and Casadevall 2012; Lacetera and Zirulia 2009;
Pozzi and David 2007). For scholars of scientific and technological change, retractions provide
an unusual lens to deepen our understanding of the dynamics of cumulative knowledge
production, particularly as we seek to move beyond analyses of the determinants of the rate
of inventive activity towards an understanding of the factors shaping the choice of research
direction (Aghion, et al. 2008, Dasgupta and David 1994; Furman and Stern 2011).
The spillover effects of retractions on the evolution of research fields is particularly impor-
tant given the broader welfare implications that arise from scientists shifting their position in
“intellectual space” (Aghion et al. 2008, Acemoglu 2012, Borjas and Doran 2012). However,
evidence is currently limited. As a starting point, systematic data on journal article retrac-
tions shows a strong upward trend in frequency, but as in the case of criminal activity, the
underlying magnitude of scientific mistakes and misdeeds remains poorly established (Mar-
tinson, Anderson, and de Vries 2005). In addition, a recent analysis shows that the majority
2
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of retractions are caused by misconduct (Fang et al. 2012). More salient for the evolution
of fields, Furman, Jensen, and Murray (2012) provide evidence that retraction notices are
effective in alerting follow-on researchers to the shaky foundations of a particular paper.
Citations to retracted papers decline by over 60% in the post-retraction period relative to
carefully matched controls. Their analysis, however, focuses on the fate of the retracted
papers themselves, not whether and to what extent retractions influence the evolution of
adjacent research areas. It also does not distinguish between different types of false science
associated with retracted events, although this heterogeneity is of primary importance since
the information that retraction provides regarding the veracity of associated knowledge can
vary widely. Thus, the challenge for our paper is to elucidate the impact of different types of
retractions on related research lines and the magnitude of spillovers to research in proximate
intellectual space.
Our conceptual approach follows Acemoglu (2012), Aghion and co-authors (2009), and
others in understanding research as arising through a cumulative process along and across
research lines that can be traced out empirically through citations from one publication
to another (e.g., Murray and Stern 2007). This approach is grounded in the assumption
that knowledge accumulates as researchers take the knowledge in a particular publication
and use it as a stepping stone for their follow-on investigations (Mokyr 2002). Although
it is a commonplace insight that the process of knowledge accumulation unfolds within an
intellectual space (e.g., Hull 1988), it has proven surprisingly difficult for social scientists to
gain empirical traction on this concept (see Azoulay, Graff Zivin, and Wang [2010] and Borjas
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and Doran [2012] for rare exceptions). We conceptualize retraction events as “shocks” to
the structure of the intellectual neighborhoods around the retracted papers, and implement
a procedure to delineate the boundaries of this space in terms of related publications in a
way that is scalable and transparent, and with scant reliance on human judgement. We are
then interested in studying whether researchers increase or decrease their reliance on related
papers following the retraction event. We differentiate this cumulative response across three
types of retractions: papers with results that have been clearly shown to be invalid and
should not be used as the basis of future research (which, borrowing from Newton’s aphorism
regarding the process of knowledge accumulation as “standing on the shoulders of giants,” we
label “absent shoulders” papers), papers where retraction creates doubt about — but does
not clearly nullify — the value of the content for follow-on research (“shaky shoulders”),
and papers where retraction does not cast aspersions on the validity of the findings (“strong
shoulders”).1
A priori, retraction events could be thought to have two countervailing effects on the
intensity of follow-on research direction. On the one hand, researchers may simply substitute
away from the specific retracted paper and increase their reliance on other research in the
same intellectual field, effectively increasing the prominence of the unretracted papers in
1Isaac Newton acknowledged the importance of cumulative research in a famous 1676
letter to rival Robert Hooke: “What Des-Cartes did was a good step. You have added much
several ways, & especially in taking ye colours of thin plates unto philosophical consideration.
If I have seen further it is by standing on ye sholders of Giants” (quoted in Stephen Inwood,
2003, pp. 216).
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that same field. On the other hand, researchers (and/or their funders) may substitute away
from the related research line, and not simply from the retracted paper. Our results clearly
show that the latter effect dominates.
Using the PubMed Related Citations Algorithm [PMRA] to delineate the fields surround-
ing over 1,100 retracted articles in the biomedical research literature, we show that 60,000
related articles experience on average a 6% decline in their citation rate following retraction,
relative to the background citation rates for 110,000 control articles that appeared in the
same journals and time periods (an empirical approach to controlling for citation trajectories
that has been used effectively in prior work on the effect of scientific institutions and gover-
nance, e.g., Furman and Stern [2011]). Moreover, this effect is entirely driven by the fate of
articles related to retractions with shaky or absent shoulders: There is no broad impact on
the field when the retraction occurred because of plagiarism or publisher error. In contrast,
mistakes, fake data, and difficulties arising in replication attempts have negative spillover
effects on intellectual neighbors. Although the collateral damage (measured in lost citations)
is about ten times smaller than the direct penalty suffered by the associated retracted article,
we find the effect to be persistent and increasing in magnitude over time.
We exploit finer grained levels of our data in order to paint a deeper picture of the impact
of retraction on related fields and on heterogeneity in the size of the effect. The negative
effect is concentrated among articles most related to the retracted paper. It is also stronger
among relatively “hot fields” of research, in which a high fraction of related articles appear
contemporaneously with the ultimately retracted articles, and “crowded” fields, in which the
5
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most-related articles achieve particularly high PubMed relatedness rankings. These results
suggest that the degree of scientific competition within a field impacts the way in which
negative shocks affect knowledge accumulation.
We conclude our analysis by examining the proximate causes and potential underlying
mechanisms behind the observed citation decline. We find evidence that publication rates in
the fields affected by a retraction markedly decrease following retraction, relative to control
fields. Similarly, we find that funding by National Institutes of Health (NIH) in these fields
declines in an even sharper fashion. We consider two mechanisms that may lie behind these
effects. First, we examine evidence regarding the strength of a learning interpretation rela-
tive to one based on status concerns. On the one hand, we might simply be observing that
retraction events enable scientists to discover that a particular field offers fewer prospects of
important findings than was previously believed, leaving them to substitute away from that
field onto lines of research that are not directly adjacent to the retracted knowledge. Alterna-
tively, scientists in the affected fields might believe that their reputation will be besmirched
if they tie their scientific agenda too tightly to a field that has been “contaminated” by a
retraction. Status concerns of this kind would just as surely drive away previous (or poten-
tial) participants in the field, but such shifts would this time be construed as constituting
under-investment in the affected areas from a welfare standpoint.
We find suggestive evidence that the status interpretation accounts for at least part of
the damage suffered by retraction-aﬄicted fields. First, we document that, even in the set
of articles related to retractions offering entirely absent shoulders to follow-on researchers,
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intent matters in modulating the observed citation responses: the penalty suffered by related
articles is much more severe when the associated source article was retracted because of fraud
or misconduct, relative to cases where the retraction occurred because of “honest mistakes.”
Second, starting from the premise that status considerations are less likely to drive the citing
behavior of scientists employed in industry, relative to that of academic citers, we show that
the former are much less responsive to the retraction event than the latter. While a learning
story suggests strengthening the retraction system in its current incarnation, the evidence
for a status explanation suggests that researchers overreact to retraction notices under the
current system.
In the remainder of the paper, we examine the institutional context for retractions as
the central approach to governing scientific mistakes and misconduct and lay out our broad
empirical strategy. We then turn to data, methods and a detailed presentation of our results.
We conclude by outlining the implications of our findings for the design of governance mech-
anisms that could help the “Republic of Science” better cope with the specific challenges
posed by the existence of false scientific knowledge.
2 Institutional Context and Empirical Design
Knowledge accumulation — the process by which follow-on researchers build on ideas de-
veloped by prior generations of researchers — has been long understood to be of central
importance to scientific progress and economic growth (Mokyr 2002; Romer 1994). In def-
7
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erence to Sir Isaac Newton, this cumulative process is often referred to as “standing on the
shoulders of giants,” but is conceptualized more prosaically as the way in which researchers
in one generation learn from and build upon prior research. A variety of institutions and
incentives have arisen to support this cumulative process. While substantial scholarship
has focused on understanding the role of openness in facilitating knowledge accumulation,2
there is scant evidence regarding the role of institutions that support the fidelity of scientific
knowledge (ORI 2007; Pozzi and David 2007; Lacetera and Zirulia 2009) and even less ex-
ploration of their effectiveness (Furman, Jensen and Murray 2012; Lu, Jin, Jones and Uzzi
2012). This is particularly unfortunate in light of recent instances of large-scale scientific
fraud and mistakes that have brought to the fore concerns regarding the scientific and eco-
nomic effectiveness of the institutions that govern the cumulative production of knowledge.
Episodic popular and political interest is usually inspired by the discovery of high-profile
cases of fraud (cf. Babbage 1830; Weiner 1955; Broad and Wade 1983; LaFollette 1992)
and the recent rise in misconduct has attracted the attention of the scientific community,
including specialized blogs such as RetractionWatch.3
In contrast to popular accounts, which often focus on the shock value and the scandalous
aspects of scientific misconduct, an economic analysis of false science hinges on its impact
2These include the norms of open science (Dasgupta and David 1994, David 2008), mate-
rial repositories (Furman and Stern 2011), patent disclosure and licensing policies (Murray
and Stern 2007, Aghion et al. 2009, Murray 2010), and information technology (Agrawal
and Goldfarb 2008, Ding et al. 2010).
3http://retractionwatch.wordpress.com/
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on cumulative scientific progress. If researchers are unwittingly building on false or shaky
research results, their effort is wasted and scientific progress stifled. To our knowledge,
this study is the first to document systematically how false science shapes the direction of
scientific research.
2.1 Institutional Context
Very few practices or systems exist to identify and signal research misconduct or error. In
the United States, key public funders have created an Office of Research Integrity (ORI)
to investigate allegations of fraud or misconduct (Pozzi and David 2007). More broadly
applicable is the system of retractions used by journals themselves to alert readers when a
research publication is stricken from the scientific literature. Retractions can be made by all
or some of the authors of a publication, or by the journal’s editor, directly or at the request of
the authors’ employer. These events can occur for a variety of reasons, as we describe below.
Retraction events remain very rare, with the unconditional odds of retraction standing at
about one per ten thousand, regardless of the data source used to calculate these odds (see
Lu et al. 2013 for tabulations stemming from Thomson-Reuters’ Web of Science database).
Figure A of Section I in the online appendix documents secular increases in the incidence of
retractions in PubMed, where this incidence is measured both as a raw frequency and as a
proportion relative to the total size of the PubMed universe.4
4While this paper is not focused on the determinants of false science but rather its impact,
it is worth noting that the rise in instances of false science (or at least the increase in
its documentation via retraction notices) may be linked to a range of factors including
9
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As a matter of institutional design, the system of retractions treads a treacherous middle
ground in managing the integrity of scientific knowledge. At one end of the spectrum,
scientific societies and journals could make significant investments in replicating and verifying
all studies prior to publication, while at the other end, a knowledge registration system with
no filtering mechanism could require researchers to expend considerable time and energy on
replication and validation. The actual system in existence today relies heavily upon peer-
review but provides only limited guarantee that published knowledge is of high fidelity. As
a result, reputational incentives play an essential role to ensure the integrity of the scientific
enterprise (Merton 1973).
In practice, retraction notices are idiosyncratic and vary widely in the amount of infor-
mation they provide, ranging from a one line sentence to a more elaborated statement of
the rationale behind the retraction event. Understanding their impact on the scientific com-
munity is of central importance to the process of cumulative knowledge production and in
deriving implications for the allocation of resources, human and financial, within and across
scientific fields.
the increasingly complex and collaborative organization of the scientific enterprise (Wutchy,
Jones and Uzzi 2007) and the growing competition for resources in science. Lacetera and
Zirulia (2009) note that competition has ambiguous effects on the incidence of scientific
misconduct since scientists can also gain prominence by detecting instances of false science.
10
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2.2 Empirical Design
Our core research questions require that we overcome two separate data collection challenges.
First, we must develop a coding scheme to parse the underlying reasons behind each of the
(over 1,100) retractions that serve as “shocks” to the range of intellectual fields we examine.
Our coding must also account for the degree to which the retraction leaves intact vs. knocks
down the foundations upon which follow-on researchers may build. Second, we need a
credible approach to systematically identify other journal articles that lie in close proximity
in intellectual space to the retracted articles as well as a metric to measure their degree of
proximity.
Categorizing retraction events. To meet the first challenge, we have developed a detailed
taxonomy of retracted articles to capture the differences in the meaning of the retraction
events for follow-on researchers, as described in Section II of the online appendix. In a
second step and taking inspiration from Newton’s aphorism, we then systematically assigned
the 1,104 retractions in our sample to three mutually exclusive buckets denoted, “Strong
Shoulders,” “Shaky Shoulders,” and “Absent Shoulders,” respectively:
• “Strong Shoulders” means that the retraction does not in any way degrade the validity
of the paper’s analysis or claims. This may happen in instances where a publisher
mistakenly printed an article twice, when authors published an ostensibly valid study
without securing approval to publish the (unchallenged) data , or when an institutional
dispute over the ownership of research materials arose.
11
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• “Shaky Shoulders” means that the validity of claims is uncertain or that a fraction of
the results is invalid. The typical use of this category concerns instances where results
could not be replicated, among other reasons.
• “Absent Shoulders” is the appropriate code for retractions associated with fraudulent
results, as well as in cases where a mistake in experimental procedure irretrievably
invalidates the paper’s results.
In addition, we differentiate between retractions for which the authors intentionally at-
tempted to subvert the scientific truth and those for which the article needed to be retracted
because of an honest mistake with no indication of foul play. We therefore examined re-
tractions to develop a code for different levels of intentional deception.5 We use “No Sign
of Intentional Deception” to code cases where the authors did not intend to deceive, such
as instances of miscommunication, contamination of research materials, or coding error.
“Uncertain Intent” applies where fraud is not firmly established, but negligence or unsub-
stantiated claims raise questions about the authors’ motives. The “Intentional Deception”
code is reserved for cases where falsification, misconduct, or willful acts of plagiarism and
self-plagiarism appear to have occurred and were verified by author admissions or indepen-
dent reviews of misconduct.
5Deception might involve the paper’s factual claims (results, materials, or methods), its
attribution of scholarly credit through authorship and citations, or the originality of the
work.
12
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Delineating research fields. To delineate the boundaries of the research fields affected
by retracted articles, we develop an approach based on topic similarity as inferred by the
overlap in keywords between each retracted articles and the rest of the (unretracted) scientific
literature. Specifically, we use the PubMed Related Citations Algorithm (PMRA) which
relies heavily on Medical Subject Headings (MeSH). MeSH terms constitute a controlled
vocabulary maintained by the National Library of Medicine that provides a very fine-grained
partition of the intellectual space spanned by the biomedical research literature. Importantly
for our purposes, MeSH keywords are assigned to each scientific publication by professional
indexers and not by the authors themselves; the assignment is made without reference to
the literature cited in the article. We then use the “Related Articles” function in PubMed
to harvest journal articles that are proximate to the retracted articles, implicitly defining
a scientific field as the set of articles whose MeSH keywords overlap with those tagging
the ultimately retracted article. As a byproduct, PMRA provides us with both an ordinal
and a cardinal dyadic measure of intellectual proximity between each related article and its
associated retraction. For the purposes of our main analysis, we only consider related articles
published prior to the retraction date. We distinguish those published prior to the retracted
article and those published in the window between the retracted article’s publication date and
the retraction event itself. Further, we also exclude related articles with any co-authors in
common with the retracted article in order to strip bare our measure of intellectual proximity
from any “associational baggage” stemming from collaboration linkages. Finally, we build
a set of control articles by selecting the “nearest neighbors” of the related articles, i.e., the
13
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articles appearing immediately before or immediately after in the same journal and issue, as
in Furman and Stern (2011) and Furman et al. (2012a).6
Empirical strategy. Together, these advances allow us to estimate the causal impact of
retraction events on the vitality of scientific fields. We start by examining the impact of a
retraction on the citations to the retracted papers themselves, in a reprise of the earlier study
by Furman et al. (2012a), but using a more complete sample and carefully differentiating the
effect across different types of retractions. Indeed, to the extent that retractions are highly
differentiated in the information they impart to follow-on researchers regarding the strength
of the shoulders upon which they stand, we would anticipate that this type of variation would
powerfully moderate the impact on follow-on citations. We then perform the main exercise
of the paper by examining the impact of retraction events on citations to related articles and
their controls in a simple difference-in-differences framework. Again, we separately estimate
the impact of different types of retractions.
Lastly, we explore the mechanisms that may be at play, focusing on the set of “absent
shoulder” retractions. We do so by exploring citations to related articles made by authors in
academia versus industry, on the assumption that status effects (in comparison to learning
6We select the nearest neighbors as controls on the premise that the ordering of papers in
journal issues is random or close to random. To validate this premise, in analyses available
from the author, we replicate the results in Table 8 with an alternative control group where
one control is selected from each journal issue literally at random. The results do not differ
substantially.
14
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effects) are more likely to influence the citing behavior of academic researchers than their
private-sector counterparts. We also develop an analysis of the rate of production of related
articles (rather than citation to these related articles) in the pre- and post-retraction period.
Similarly, mapping related articles to NIH funding, we explore how resources devoted to
scientific fields are influenced by retractions, comparing again to control fields. Overall, this
empirical design advances our ability to examine issues related to the direction of research
across scientific fields, and provides a nuanced understanding of the role of retractions in the
process of cumulative knowledge production.
3 Data and Sample Construction
This section details the construction of our multilevel, panel dataset.
3.1 Retracted Articles
We begin by extracting from PubMed, the public-access database which indexes the life
sciences literature, all original journal articles that were subsequently retracted, provided
that these articles were published in 2007 or earlier, and retracted in 2009 at the latest.
After purging from the list a few odd observations,7 we are left with a sample of 1,104
7These include an article retracted and subsequently unretracted, an erratum that was
retracted because of disagreement within the authorship team about whether the original
article indeed contained an error, along with a few others.
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articles.8 As detailed in Section II of the online appendix, we develop an exhaustive category
scheme to code the reasons that explain the retraction event. These reasons are tabulated
in Table 1.9 In our next step, we classify each retraction into one of three categories that
denote whether the results contained in the source article can be relied upon for follow-on
research. The “strong shoulders” subsample comprises 202 articles retracted for reasons that
do not cast any aspersion on the validity of the results contained therein. In contrast, we
classify 589 retractions (53.4%) as providing “absent shoulders” for follow-on scientists to
stand on, often because of fraudulent data or other types of misconduct. Finally, the “shaky
shoulders” category (289 events or 26.2% of the cases) groups those retraction events for
which the validity of the results remains shrouded in uncertainty.
Most of our analyses focus on the 589 observations belonging to the “absent shoulders”
subsample (Table 2). The papers in this subsample were published between 1973 and 2007
and took an average time of three years to be retracted, though many of the more recent
articles were retracted within one year — perhaps because of a higher probability of detection
8In comparison, Lu et al. (2013) extract 1,465 retraction events from Thomson Reuters’
Web of Science over the same period. The Web of Science covers a wider cross-section of
scientific fields (including the social sciences and engineering), but has shallower coverage
than PubMed in the life sciences. By combining the events corresponding to life sciences
journals as well as multidisciplinary journals — such as Science, PNAS, or Nature — it
appears that the life sciences account for between 60% and 70% of the total number of
retractions in the Lu et al. sample.
9Despite extensive efforts, we were unable to locate a retraction notice in 24 (2.17%)
cases.
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since the dawn of the electronic publishing era. Although this subsample is dominated by
instances of fraud or other types of misconduct, 31% of the events appear to be the results
of honest mistakes on the part of the investigators involved, with a further 8% for which
it is unclear whether the scientists actively subverted the scientific process in the course of
performing the research and reporting its results.10
Regardless of intent, however, it would be a mistake to consider each observation as
completely independent from all the others in the sample. Close to sixty percent of the
observations can be grouped into cases involving more than one retraction event, for example
because the same rogue investigator committed fraud in multiple papers, or because the
same contaminated research materials were used in multiple published articles. Figure B
of Section I in the online appendix displays the histogram of the distribution of retraction
events by retraction case (N = 334). The case identifier will play an important role in the
econometric analysis since all of our results will report standard errors clustered at the case
level of analysis.
3.2 Related Articles
Traditionally, it has been very difficult to assign to individual scientists, or articles, a fixed
address in “idea space,” and this data constraint explains in large part why bibliometric
10This represents an inversion of the relative prevalence of fraud and mistakes, compared
to an earlier analysis performed by Nath et al. (2006), but it is in line with the recent results
reported by Fang et al. (2012).
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analyses typically focus on the determinants of the rate of scientific progress rather than its
direction. The empirical exercise in this paper hinges crucially on the ability to relax this
constraint in a way that is consistent across retraction events and also requires little, if any,
human judgement.
This challenge is met here by the use of the PubMed Related Citations Algorithm
[PMRA], a probabilistic, topic-based model for content similarity that underlies the “re-
lated articles” search feature in PubMed. This database feature is designed to aid a typical
user search through the literature by presenting a set of records topically related to any
article returned by a PubMed search query.11 To assess the degree of intellectual similarity
between any two PubMed records, PMRA relies crucially on MeSH keywords. MeSH is the
National Library of Medicine’s [NLM] controlled vocabulary thesaurus. It consists of sets of
terms naming descriptors in a hierarchical structure that permits searching at various levels
of specificity. There are 26,581 descriptors in the 2012 MeSH edition (new terms are added
to the dictionary as scientific advances are made). Almost every publication in PubMed is
tagged with a set of MeSH terms (between 1 and 103 in the current edition of PubMed, with
both the mean and median approximately equal to 11). NLM’s professional indexers are
trained to select indexing terms from MeSH according to a specific protocol, and consider
each article in the context of the entire collection (Bachrach and Charen 1978; Ne´ve´ol et al.
2010). What is key for our purposes is that the subjectivity inherent in any indexing task
11Lin and Wilbur (2007) report that one fifth of “non-trivial” browser sessions in PubMed
involve at least one invocation of PMRA.
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is confined to the MeSH term assignment process, which occurs upstream of the retraction
event and does not involve the articles’ authors.
Using the MeSH keywords as input, PMRA essentially defines a distance concept in
idea space such that the proximity between a source article and any other PubMed-indexed
publication can be assessed. The algorithm focuses on the smallest neighborhood in this
space that includes 100 related records.12 Given our set of source articles, we delineate the
scientific fields to which they belong by focusing on the set of articles returned by PMRA
that satisfy five additional constraints: (i) they are original articles (as opposed to editorials,
comments, reviews, etc.); (ii) they were published up to the year that precedes the calendar
year of the underlying retraction event; (iii) they appear in journals indexed by the Web
of Science (so that follow-on citation information can be collected); (iv) they do not share
any author with the source, and (v) they are cited at least once by another article indexed
by the Web of Science in the period between their publication year and 2011. Figure C of
Section I in the online appendix runs through a specific example in the sample to illustrate
12However, the algorithm embodies a transitivity rule as well as a minimum distance cutoff
rule, such that the effective number of related articles returned by PMRA varies between 4
and 2,642 in the larger sample of 1,104 retractions, with a mean of 172 records and a median
of 121.
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the use of PMRA.13 Section III of the online appendix illustrates through an example how
PMRA processes MeSH keyword information to delineate the boundaries of research fields.
For the set of 589 retractions with absent shoulders, the final dataset comprises 32,699
related articles that can be ordered by relatedness using both an ordinal measure (the rank
returned by PMRA) as well as a cardinal measure which we normalize such that a score of
100% corresponds to the first “non-trivial” related record.14
As a result of these computational and design choices, the boundaries of the fields we
delineate are derived from semantic linkages to the exclusion of other considerations such as
backward and forward citation relationships, or coauthorships. Judgement and subjectivity
is confined to the initial indexing task which assigns keywords to individual articles. The
individuals performing these tasks are trained in a consistent way, draw the keywords from
a controlled vocabulary which evolves only slowly over time, and do not have any incentives
to “window-dress” the articles they index with terms currently in vogue in order to curry
attention from referees, editors, or members of funding panels. Of course, the cost of this
approach is that it may result in boundaries between fields that might only imperfectly
13To facilitate the harvesting of PubMed-related records on a large scale, we have
developed an open-source software tool that queries PubMed and PMRA and stores
the retrieved data in a MySQL database. The software is available for download at
http://www.stellman-greene.com/FindRelated/.
14A source article is always trivially related to itself. The relatedness measures are based
on the raw data returned by PMRA, and ignore the filters applied to generate the final
analysis dataset, e.g., eliminating reviews, etc.
20
	
				


469
 
!"

##$
%%&'(")"*%%
+
# 
	 
,#
'
	 #%+
dovetail with the contours of the scientific communities with which the authors in our sample
would self-identify. The main benefit, however, is that it makes it sensible to use citation
information to evaluate whether the narrow fields around each retracted article atrophy or
expand following each retraction event.
3.3 Identification Strategy and Nearest-Neighbor Controls
A natural starting point to identify the spillovers of retraction events on their associated fields
is to examine changes in citations received by the set of related articles after the retraction,
relative to before, using a simple related article fixed effects specification. Since the retraction
effect is mechanically correlated with the passage of time as well as with a paper’s vintage,
our specifications must include age and calendar year effects, as is the norm in empirical
studies of scientific productivity (Levin and Stephan 1991). In this framework, the control
group that pins down the counterfactual age and calendar time effects for articles related to a
current retraction is comprised of other related articles whose associated retraction occurred
in earlier periods or will occur in future periods. This approach may be problematic in
our setting. First, related articles observed after their associated retraction event are not
appropriate controls if the event affected the trend in the citation rate; Second, the fields
from which retractions are drawn might not represent a random cross-section of all scientific
fields, but rather might be subject to idiosyncratic life cycle patterns, with their productive
potential first increasing over time, eventually peaking, and thereafter slowly declining. If
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this is the case, fixed effects will overestimate the true effect of the retraction effect, at least
if we rely on articles treated in earlier or later periods as an “implicit” control group.
To mitigate these threats to identification, our preferred empirical strategy relies on the
selection of matched controls for each related — i.e., “treated” — article. In concrete terms,
we select as controls for each related article their “nearest neighbors” in the same journal,
volume, and issue, i.e., the two articles that immediately precede and follow the treated
article. When the related article is first or last in the particular issue of the journal consid-
ered, we select a single control. The final dataset corresponding to the “Absent Shoulders”
subsample comprises 65,461 such controls.
One potential concern with this control group is that its members may also be affected by
the retraction treatment, since they are drawn from the same set of journals as the related
articles. In what follows, we ignore this threat to identification for three separate reasons.
First, the fields identified by PMRA are extremely thin slices of intellectual space, and their
boundaries do not depend on journal or date of publication information (see Section III of the
online appendix). Second, in the extremely rare cases in which one of these nearest neighbor
controls also happens to be related to a retraction through the algorithm, we select instead
the article that is “twice removed” in the table of contents from the focal related article.
Finally, as can be observed in Table 3, the rate at which the controls cite the retraction with
which they are indirectly associated is almost two orders of magnitude smaller than the rate
of citation that links the retractions with the “treated” (i.e., related) articles.
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Citation data. PubMed does not contain citation data but we were able to retrieve this
information from the Web of Science (up to the end of 2011) using a perl script. We further
process these data to make them amenable to statistical analysis. First, we eliminate all
self-citations, where self-citation is inferred by overlap between any of the cited authors with
any of the citing authors (an author name is the combination formed by the last name and
the first initial for the purpose of this filter). Second, we parse the citing article data to
distinguish between the institutional affiliations of citers, in particular by flagging the citing
articles for which at least one of the addresses recorded by the Web of Science is a corporate
address, which we infer from the presence of abbreviations such as Inc, Corp, GmbH, Ltd,
etc. We then aggregate this information at the cited article-year level of analysis. In other
words, we can decompose the total number of citations flowing to individual articles at a
given point in time into a “private” and a “public” set, where public citations should be
understood as stemming from academic scientists, broadly construed (this will also include
scientists employed in the public sector as well as those employed by non-profit research
institutes). Citations are a noisy and widely-used measure of the impact of a paper and the
attention it receives. But the use of citation data to trace out the diffusion of individual bits of
scientific knowledge is subject to an important caveat. Citations can be made for “strategic”
rather than “substantial” reasons (cf. Lampe [2012] for evidence in this spirit in the context
of patent citations). For example, authors of a paper may prefer to reduce the number of
citations in order to make larger claims for their own paper; they may be more likely to “get
away with it” (i.e., not having editors and referees request to add citations) if the strategically
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uncited papers are close in intellectual space to a retracted paper. Unfortunately, we do not
have the ability to parse the citation data to distinguish strategic from substantial citations,
a limitation that the reader should bear in mind when interpreting our results.
Descriptive Statistics. Table 3 provides basic information about the matched sample. By
construction, control and treated articles are matched on year of publication and journal,
and they appear to match very closely on the length of the authorship roster. Because in
many cases, retraction occurs relatively quickly after publication, only 30% of the related
articles in the data are published after the publication of the source article, and only 7.9%
of these articles cite the soon-to-be-retracted source. Conversely, only 6.1% of the articles
at risk of being cited by the source (because they were published before its publication) are
in fact cited by it.
Table 3 indicates that related articles and their nearest neighbors differ slightly in the total
number of citations received at baseline (the calendar year preceding the retraction event),
with related articles having received 1.7 citations more on average than the controls. Figure 1
compares the distributions of cumulative baseline citations for control and related articles,
respectively. The controls appear to be slightly more likely to have received zero or one
citation at baseline. This is not necessarily surprising, if, as mentioned above, articles related
to retractions are drawn from fields that draw more attention from the scientific community
in the years leading up to the retraction event. Nonetheless, these small differences in the
level of citations at baseline could prove problematic for our identification strategy if they
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translate into preexisting trends in citations for treated articles, relative to control articles
in the pre-retraction period. We will carefully document below that such pre-trends are
extremely small in magnitude and undetectable from a statistical standpoint, buttressing
the core assumption that underlies our empirical strategy.
3.4 Field-level Analyses
To examine the proximate causes of the spillover effects of retractions on their fields, we study
whether patterns of entry into these fields, or the funding that accrues to active researchers
in these same fields, is altered by the retraction event. To do so, we create a second dataset
that collapses the related article-level data onto a retracted article-level panel dataset.
As previously, we view scientific fields as isomorphic to the set of articles related (through
PMRA) to a given source article. In contrast to the previous section, however, we make use
of the related articles published after a retraction event (as well as before). A “field” is
born in the year during which the oldest related article was published. Starting from the
set of 589 retractions in the “absent shoulders” subsample, we eliminate 24 observations for
which this oldest related article is “too young” — it appeared less than five years before the
retraction event. This ensures that all the fields in the dataset have at least a five year time
series before its associated retraction event; each field defined in this way is followed up to
the end of 2011. We then select 1,076 “nearest neighbor” articles that appear in the same
journal and issue as the retracted articles, allowing us to delineate 1,076 control fields in an
analogous fashion.
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It is then straightforward to compute yearly “entry rates” into treated and control fields
by counting the number of related articles published in the field in each year. Capturing fund-
ing information at the field level is slightly more involved. PubMed systematically records
NIH grant acknowledgements using grant numbers, but without referencing the particular
grant cycle to which the publication should be credited. To address this issue, we adopt the
following procedure: for each related publication, we identify the closest preceding year in
a three-year window during which funding was awarded through either a new award or a
competitive renewal; we then sum all the funding in the grant year that ultimately generates
publications in the focal field.
The descriptive statistics for the field-level analyses are displayed on Table 4. The num-
ber of observations across the publication frequency dataset and the funding dataset differ
because (i) the funding data are available only until 2007, whereas the publication data is
available until the end of our observation period (2011); and (ii) we drop from the funding
analysis the fields for which there is not a single publication acknowledging NIH funding for
the entire 1970-2007 period.
4 Results
The exposition of the econometric results proceeds in four stages. After a brief exposition of
the main econometric issues, we present descriptive statistics and results pertaining to the
effect of retractions on the rate of citations that accrue to the retracted articles. Second, we
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examine the extent of the retraction effect on the set of related articles. Third, we study
whether the retraction events altered patterns of entry and funding into the scientific fields
associated with the retracted articles. Fourth, we explicate the mechanism(s) underlying the
results.
4.1 Econometric Considerations
Our estimating equation relates the number of citations that are received by related article j
in year t to characteristics of j and of retracted article i:
E [CITESjt|Xijt] = exp [β0 + β1RLTDj × AFTERit + f(AGEjt) + δt + γij]
where AFTER denotes an indicator variable that switches to one the year after the retrac-
tion, RLTD denotes an indicator variable that is equal to one for related articles and zero for
control articles, f(AGEjt) corresponds to a flexible function of article j’s age, the δt’s stand
for a full set of calendar year indicator variables, and the γij’s correspond to source arti-
cle/related article (or control) fixed effects, consistent with our approach to analyze changes
in j’s rate of citations following the retraction of source article i.
The fixed effects control for many individual characteristics that could influence citation
rates, such as journal status. To flexibly account for article-level life cycle effects, f(AGE)
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consists of thirty two age indicator variables, where age measures the number of years elapsed
since the article was published.15
Estimation. The dependent variable of interest is extremely skewed. For example, 40.33%
of the article-year observations in the data correspond to years in which the related ar-
ticles/controls receive zero citations. Following a long-standing tradition in the study of
scientific and technical change, we present conditional quasi-maximum likelihood estimates
based on the fixed-effect Poisson model developed by Hausman et al. (1984). Because the
Poisson model is in the linear exponential family, the coefficient estimates remain consis-
tent as long as the mean of the dependent variable is correctly specified (Gourie´roux et al.
1984).16
Inference. QML standard errors are robust to arbitrary patterns of serial correlation
(Wooldridge 1997), and hence immune to the issues highlighted by Bertrand et al. (2004)
concerning inference in DD estimation. We cluster the standard errors around retraction
cases in the results presented below.
15The omitted category corresponds to articles in their year of publication, i.e., articles’
birth year. It is not possible to separately identify calendar year effects from age effects in the
within-article dimension of our panel dataset in a completely flexible fashion, because one
cannot observe two articles at the same point in time that have the same age but different
vintages (Hall et al. 2007). In our specifications, the indicator variable corresponding to
articles in their thirty-first year also absorbs the subsequent age dummies.
16In Section IV of the online appendix, we find that OLS estimation yields qualitatively
similar findings.
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Dependent Variables. Our primary outcome variable is an article’s number of citations in
a given year. Secondary outcomes include the number of related articles (either to retracted
papers or their nearest neighbors) published before and after the retraction event, as well as
the amount of NIH funding (in millions of 2007 dollars) flowing to scientists who subsequently
publish related articles (either to retracted papers or their nearest neighbors). Though the
funding measure is distributed over the positive real line, the Hausman et al. estimator can
still be used in this case (Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2006).
4.2 Effect of Retraction on Retracted Papers
Table 5 reports the results from simple difference-in-differences analyses for the sample of
1,037 retractions and 1,922 nearest neighbors in the journals in which the retracted articles
appeared.17 Column 1 reports the estimate of the retraction effect for the baseline specifi-
cation. The result implies that, relative to the controls, retracted papers lose 69% of their
citations in the post-retraction period. The magnitude of the effect is in line with the 60%
decline estimated by Furman et al. (2012a) in a smaller sample of PubMed-indexed retrac-
tions. Column 2 shows that the effect is barely affected when we drop from the sample those
observations corresponding to retracted articles for which the retraction reason is missing.
Column 3 includes in the specifications the main effect of the retraction treatment as well
as two interactions with the “shaky shoulders” and “absent shoulders” indicator variables.
17Sixty seven retracted articles needed to be dropped from the estimation sample because
they appeared in journals not indexed by the Web of Science.
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In this model, the main effect implicitly captures the post-retraction fate of the retracted
papers that still maintain “strong shoulders.” While this effect is negative and statistically
significant (with an implied decrease in the citation rate equal to 38%) its magnitude is
markedly smaller than that of the effect corresponding to the “shaky shoulders” retractions
(66%) and smaller still than the effect for the “absent shoulders” category (73%). Dropping
the “strong shoulders” group from the sample increases the magnitude of the retraction effect
in absolute value (to 72%, column 4), while focusing on the earliest retraction event in each
case slightly lowers the estimated effect (66%, column 5).
In short, our results confirm the earlier findings of Furman et al. (2012a). In addition, the
results in column 3 provide important empirical validation for the coding exercise detailed
in the online appendix. Although the coefficients in this specification are not statistically
different from each other, their magnitudes are ordered in an intuitive way, with the post-
retraction penalty decreasing monotonically with the strength of the shoulders provided to
follow-on researchers.
4.3 Effect of Retraction on Related Papers
We now turn to the core of the empirical analysis, examining the effect of retraction on
the citation outcomes for the related articles identified by the PubMed Related Citations
Algorithm. The first set of results appears in Table 6, which is structured analogously to
Table 5. Column 1 reports the difference-in-difference estimate for the entire sample. We find
that related articles experience a precisely estimated 5.73% decline in the rate at which they
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are cited in the post-retraction period, relative to the control articles. Column 2 shows that
the estimate does not change after dropping the articles related to retractions for which we
were unable to find the underlying reason. Column 3 parses the retraction effect according
to our “shoulders” coding. A clear difference emerges between the fate of articles related
to “strong shoulders” retraction and the fate of those related to either “shaky shoulders”
or “absent shoulders” retractions. The articles related to “strong shoulders” retractions
are essentially immune to the retraction event (in fact the estimated effect is positive, but
also small in magnitude and not statistically different from zero). In contrast, the implied
elasticities for the articles related to “shaky shoulders” and “absent shoulders” retractions
are 8.70% and 6.20%, respectively (the corresponding estimates are not statistically different
from each other). In other words, we find evidence of negative spillovers of the retraction
event onto the adjacent research area, but only in the cases for which the underlying cause of
the retraction suggests that follow-on researchers should proceed with caution (if proceeding
at all) before building on the retracted paper’s results.
By eliminating from the estimation sample the observations associated with “strong
shoulders” retractions, Column 4 further documents that the negative spillovers stemming
from the retraction event are of comparable magnitudes for articles related to both “shaky
shoulders” and “absent shoulders” retractions. Column 5 only retains the first retraction
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event across retraction cases. Although the magnitude of the treatment effect shrinks some-
what, it remains negative and precisely estimated.18
The rest of our analysis focuses on the “absent shoulders” subsample of 589 retrac-
tions and 98,160 related and control articles. Figure 2 provides a way of scaling the nega-
tive spillovers of retraction events onto their related fields by comparing the post-retraction
penalty experienced by related articles with the post-retraction penalty experienced by the
retracted articles themselves. In both cases, the penalty is measured by differencing the log
number of cumulative citations between 2011 and the year of the retraction event (using
instead a fixed two-year window starting in the year of the retraction yields very similar
results). The slope of the regression line is very close to .1, indicating that related arti-
cles lose, on average, only one tenth of the citations lost by the retraction. We note that
this ratio dovetails with that of the elasticities estimated in Tables 5 and 6, respectively.
Moreover, with an average of 60 related papers per retracted article, the aggregate citation
consequences of the retraction events for the scientific fields involved are not trivial.
To provide a better sense of the magnitude of these aggregate losses, we estimate an
analog of Table 6 using OLS in Section IV of the online appendix. The dependent variable is
the number of citations received in levels. The results are substantially unchanged compared
to our benchmark Poisson specification. Furthermore, the citation decline estimated therein
(-0.173 citation per year) can form the basis of back-of-the-envelope calculation. Using this
18These results, reported as QML Poisson estimates in Table 6, are consistent with results
obtained from negative binomial regressions with bootstrapped standard errors.
32
	
				


469
 
!"

##$
%%&'(")"*%%
+
# 
	 
,#
'
	 #%+
estimate of the citation penalty and aggregating to the field level (taking into account both
the average numbers of articles per field and the average length of the post-retraction period
in the sample), we conclude that retraction-aﬄicted fields experience, on average, a loss of
75 citations relative to control fields. Stated differently, this is as if we deleted from the
average field one paper in the Top 7% of the distribution for the total number of long-run
citations.
Dynamics of the treatment effect. We also explore the dynamics of the effects uncov-
ered in Table 6. We do so in Figure 3 by estimating a specification in which the treatment
effect is interacted with a set of indicator variables corresponding to a particular year rel-
ative to the retraction year, and then graphing the effects and the 95% confidence interval
around them. Two features of the figure are worthy of note. First, there is no discernible
evidence of an effect in the years leading up to the retraction, a finding that validates ex
post our identification strategy.19 Second, after the retraction, the treatment effect increases
monotonically in absolute value with no evidence of recovery.
Exploring heterogeneity in the effect of retractions. We explore a number of factors
that could modulate the magnitude of the retraction effect on intellectual neighbors’ citation
rates. Table 7 reports the results of seven specifications that include interaction terms
19This finding is also reassuring as it suggests that retractions are not endogenous to the
exhaustion of a particular intellectual trajectory, i.e., it does not appear as if researchers
resort to the type of misconduct that yields retractions after uncovering evidence that their
field is on the decline.
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between the retraction treatment effect and characteristics of either the retracted article
or the retracted/related article dyad. Column 1 evaluates how the cumulative attention
to the retracted article affects the reduction of citation to related articles. The rationale
for this analysis is that citations are a proxy for the amount of attention that scientists
in the field (and other related fields) gave to the retracted paper prior to retraction, and
may be a predictor for the amount of collateral damage in a given field. The coefficient
on the interaction term shows that highly cited retracted papers — those in the top 25th
percentile of citations at the time of retraction — have larger negative spillovers on citations
to their related papers (8.0% vs. 3.9%). However, the additional decrease is not statistically
significant at conventional levels.
Columns 2 and 3 explore how publication trends at the field-level moderate the main
retraction effect. In Column 2, we consider how a field’s “hotness” — the extent to which a
field experiences elevated rates of entry in the years leading up to the retraction—impacts
the retraction’s effect on related papers, We define a field as “hot” when the field is in the top
quartile of all fields in terms of the percentage of papers published in either the retraction year
or within three years.20 We find these very active fields feel the effect of a retraction (-14.4%)
more than “colder” fields (-3.4%). Column 3 focuses on how the intellectual concentration of
a field intensifies the treatment effect of retraction. Our measure of “crowdedness” relies on
the wedge between our ordinal measure of intellectual proximity and the cardinal measure
20The field consists of all the related papers, as identified by the PMRA algorithm, pub-
lished in or before the retraction year.
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returned by the PubMed Related Citations Algorithm (PMRA). In some fields, the twenty
fifth most related paper published prior to retraction will be closely related to the retracted
article, whereas in other fields, the twenty fifth most related paper will be only a distant
intellectual neighbor of the retraction. We label a field as “crowded” if this 25th highest
ranking related paper lies between the 75th and 100th percentile for the relatedness score.21
As is the case with “hot fields,” we see that most of the negative spillover effects occur in the
“crowded” fields, while the more diffuse fields experience little or no decrease in citations.
Columns 4 and 5 examine whether citation linkages between the related and retracted
articles moderate the magnitude of the retraction treatment effect. Recall that relatedness
in the PMRA sense does not take into account citation information, but only semantic
proximity as inferred from MeSH keywords. Related articles can be published before the
underlying source — in which case they are at risk of being cited by it — or after the
source’s publication (but before its retraction) — in which case they are at risk of citing the
soon-to-be retracted publication. In column 4, we limit the estimation sample to the articles
published after the retracted piece but before the retraction. In this subsample, we find
that the negative retraction response to be especially pronounced (-14.8%) for the 6.1% of
articles that were directly building on the retracted articles (as inferred by a citation link).
Column 5, in contrast, restricts the estimation sample to the set of related articles (and
their controls) that appeared before the retracted articles were published. We find that the
21In the rare cases where the field has less than 25 papers published in or before the
retraction year, then the score of the least related paper is used.
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related articles that are also cited by the retraction experience a 6.1% boost in the citation
rate following the retraction event. This result is consistent with the idea that the researchers
who continue to work in the field in spite of the retraction event choose to build instead on
prior, unretracted research. The overall effect on the field can still be negative since only a
small fraction (7.9%) of articles related to the source are also cited by the source. Column 6
uses our coding of author “intent” to compare how the treatment effect of retraction differs
in clear cases of fraud from fraud-free retraction cases or those with uncertain intent. We see
that cases of “Intentional Deception” largely drive the negative effect on the field’s citations
(-7.8%), while fields that experienced retractions with “No Sign of Intentional Deception”
(the omitted category) had no citation decline, on average. Figure D of Section I in the
online appendix explores the extent to which the age of a related article at the time of
the retraction event influences the magnitude of the treatment effect. In this figure, each
circle corresponds to the coefficient estimates stemming from a specification in which the
citation rates for related articles and their controls are regressed onto year effects, article age
indicator variables, as well as interaction terms between the treatment effect and the vintage
of each related articles at the time of the retraction. Since related articles in the sample are
published between one and ten years before their associated retraction event, there are ten
such interaction terms.22 The results show that only recent articles (those published one,
two, or three years before the retraction) experience a citation penalty in the post-retraction
period, whereas older articles are relatively immune to the retraction event.
22The 95% confidence intervals (corresponding to robust standard errors, clustered around
case codes) are denoted by the blue vertical bars.
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Finally, Figure 4 and Figure E (Section I in the online appendix) investigate the extent
to which “relatedness” (in the sense of PMRA) exacerbates the magnitude of the response.
In Figure 4, we use the ordinal measure of relatedness, namely the rank received by a focal
article in the list returned by PMRA for a specific source article. We create 22 interaction
variables between the retraction effect and the relatedness rank: Top 5, Top 6-10,. . . , Top 95-
100, 100 and above. The results show that lower-ranked (i.e., more closely related) articles
bear the brunt of the negative citation response in the post-retraction event. Figure E is
conceptually similar, except that it relies on the cardinal measure of relatedness. We create
one hundred variables interacting the retraction effect with each percentile of the relatedness
measure, and estimate the baseline specification of Table 7, column 1 in which the main
retraction effect has been replaced by the 100 corresponding interaction terms. Figure E
graphs the estimates along with the 95% confidence interval around them. The results are
a bit noisy, but here, too, closely related articles (those for which the relatedness measure is
above the 80th percentile) appear to experience a sharper drop in citations post-retraction.
4.4 Effect on Entry and Funding at the Field Level
So far, the empirical exercise has examined cumulative knowledge production by building
on ideas that originated before the retraction event, allowing us to hold the quality of these
ideas constant over the entire observation window. In order to understand the proximate
causes of the negative spillovers documented above, we must examine whether the retraction
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event influenced the production of new ideas in the affected fields, and assess the extent to
which these same events altered the distribution of funding across scientific fields.
Table 8 reports the results. Columns 1 through 3b report our estimate of the treatment
effect for entry into the retraction-relevant fields, whereas columns 4a and 4b report the
treatment effect for funding. A number of interesting patterns emerge. First, the response
is consistently negative, indicating that both funding and publication activity decrease in
the affected fields following the first relevant retraction event and relative to the patterns
observed in control fields. Second, the magnitude of the treatment effect increases when
we define the boundaries around fields in a stricter fashion. Third, the effect of retraction
on the rate of new publications is not meaningfully different when we look at articles in
high impact journals vs. low impact journals (columns 3a and 3b). This result implies that
the publications “lost” due to retractions do not disproportionately belong to one class of
journals. Fourth, the funding response is always larger in magnitude than the publication
response. Figure 5 provides event study graphs for both the publication intensity effect
(Panel A) and funding effect (Panel B) using the same approach as that followed in Figure 3.
In both cases, the magnitude of the retraction effect increases over time without evidence of
a reversal.
As a robustness check, we investigated whether the decline in publications might be a
result of a “mentor exit” effect, in which the removal of principal investigators reduces the
number of new researchers in the field.23 In Section V of the online appendix, we report
23We are grateful to an anonymous referee for encouraging us to pursue this explanation.
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that more of the lost field-level citations are associated with retractions where first authors
rather than last authors are identified as culpable for the retraction. These results suggest
that retraction yields the greatest negative citation outcomes not when lab directors (who
are typically listed last on scientific papers) are culpable for retractions, but when junior
investigators (post-docs and graduate students are often listed as first authors) are at fault
for retraction. Furthermore, we find that retracted first authors and middle authors are
less likely to reappear in fields in which papers have been retracted than are retracted last
authors (Section VI of the online appendix). These analyses suggest that (1) the strength
of the treatment effect is greatest when the author culpable for retraction is the first author
(rather than the last author) and (2) that the publication decline is not driven by the exit
of PIs or lab directors, but may be driven by the exit of first authors.24
To summarize, these results help explain why we observe downward movement in the
citations received by related articles highlighted earlier: There are fewer papers being pub-
lished in these fields and also less funding available to write such papers. While these effects
constitute the proximate causes of the negative spillovers that are the central finding of the
paper, they beg the question of what the underlying mechanisms are. What explains the
flight of resources away from these fields?
24These results accord well with the evidence presented in Jin et al (2013).
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4.5 Underlying Mechanisms of the Retraction Effect
A number of mechanisms may underlie our findings regarding negative citation, entry, and
funding. We investigate evidence regarding two possibilities. First, a relative decrease in
attention subsequent to retraction may reflect scientists’ learning about the limited potential
for follow-on research in retraction-aﬄicted fields. The case of Jan-Hendrik Scho¨n is con-
sistent with this explanation. Scho¨n’s research at Bell Labs initially produced spectacular
results using organic materials to achieve a field-transistor effect; his results were eventually
demonstrated to have been the result of fraudulent behavior and subsequent efforts building
on his work suggest the impossibility of achieving field-transistor effects using the materials
Scho¨n employed (Reich, 2009). Second, the field-level declines in citation, entry, and funding
we observe could also arise from a fear of reputational association with the “contaminated”
fields or authors. The case of Woo-Suk Hwang that we invoke at the beginning of the paper
is consistent with this type of explanation: Follow-on researchers eschewed all implications
of Hwang’s work, although some would prove promising when the field revisited his work a
few years after the retractions.
Although we may not be able to rule out either explanation entirely, exploring the rela-
tive importance of these mechanisms matters because their welfare implications differ. For
example, it may be ideal from a social planner’s perspective if scientists simply redirect
their efforts away from retraction-rich fields after a retraction event demonstrates their un-
promising nature. If, however, status considerations inhibit entry into potentially productive
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fields of research, the risk exists that the negative spillovers we documented earlier reflect
underinvestment from a social welfare standpoint.
We exploit the fine-grained level of detail in the data to provide evidence regarding
the relative merits of these explanations. We begin by examining whether the retracted
authors’ intent influences the citation response to related articles written before the retraction
event. Limiting the estimation sample to the set of retractions offering “absent shoulders”
to follow-on researchers, we include in the benchmark specification two additional variables
corresponding to the interaction of the retraction effect with, respectively, the “uncertain
intent” and “intentional deception” indicators mentioned earlier (Table 7, column 6). The
evidence clearly shows that the post-retraction penalty is larger when there is clear evidence
of malicious intent. It is possible that retractions associated with misconduct are, even in
this restricted sample, more consequential for the field than are retractions associated with
“honest mistakes.”25
The finding that biomedical research fields apply a greater citation penalty when errors
are intentional is consistent with the idea that a stigma attaches to research lines in which
fraud has been perpetuated. At least two other explanations are possible, however. First,
although the lack of a pre-trend in Figure 3 suggests that retraction is not the result of the
“fishing out” of a research area, intentional fraud may signal its future fruitlessness (i.e.,
25We also find this effect in models (unreported but available upon request) in which we
control for retraction “size” by including in the specification interaction terms between the
retraction effect and the quartiles of post-retraction penalty at the retracted article level.
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as progress may only be possible through active deception), whereas an honest error may
provide no such signal about future research prospects. It is also possible that the differential
response to fraud- and mistakes-aﬄicted fields may arise from the rational expectation that
fraud could be widespread, while mistakes are more likely to be idiosyncratic.26 In this view,
even if there are no costs of associating with a field going forward (e.g. because journals
and referees respond to the retraction by being more vigilant) and no learning about the
future prospects of that field, the possibility of undiscovered false science in past work may
reduce future work in that area.27 The evidence in Section 4.3 that retractions in “hot fields”
have a disproportionate effect on future citations does not lend support to these explanatory
mechanisms.
To further investigate the possibility that a reputational mechanism may be at work, we
examine heterogeneous responses between academic- and firm-based citers. We start from
the premise that scientists employed by profit-seeking firms would persist in investigating
topics that university-based scientists (and NIH study sections) frown upon (post retrac-
26Another possibility, of course, is that researchers under-react to the discovery of honest
mistakes. Though mistakes are likely more idiosyncratic than instances of fraud, one can
think of instances where this is not the case, such as with the contamination of reagents or
cell lines, as in the famous example of HeLa cells (Lucey et al. 2009).
27We thank one of our anonymous referees for highlighting this alternative interpretation.
The reviewer also noted the possibility that the “wild goose chase” effects of false science
might contribute to the decreased citations and entry in affected fields, as scientists spend
time trying to investigate and verify results related to the retracted paper.
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tion), as long as the possibility of developing a commercial product remains.28 We parse the
forward citation data to separate the citations that stem from private firms (mostly pharma-
ceutical and biotechnology firms, identified by suffixes such as Inc., Corp., LLC, Ltd., GmbH,
etc.) from those that originate in academia (broadly defined to include non-profit research
institutes and public research institutions as well as universities). Even though we classify as
“private” any citing article with a mix of private and academic addresses, almost 90% of the
citations in our sample are “academic” according to this definition. In Table 9, columns 1a
and 1b, we find that academic and private citers do not differ at all in the extent to which
they penalize the retracted articles. Conversely, columns 2a and 2b indicate that private
citers hardly penalize related articles, whereas academic citers do to the extent previously
documented.29 The difference between the coefficients is statistically significant (p < 0.01).
These findings are consistent with the view that the retraction-induced spillovers we have
documented stem, at least in part, from academic scientists’ concern that their peers will
hold them in lower esteem if they remain within an intellectual field whose reputation has
28We ground our assumptions regarding the potentially differential responses of academic-
and industry-based scientists by appealing to prior work on differences in incentives and
status concerns among academic and industrial scientists, the former of whom have princi-
pally (though not exclusively priority-based incentives) and the latter of whom face stronger
(though not exclusive) financial and organizational incentives that are not directly tied to
standing in the research community (Dasgupta and David, 1994; Stern, 2004).
29The estimation sample is limited to the set of related articles and their controls that
receive at least one citation of each type over the observation period.
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been tarnished by retractions, even though these researchers were neither coauthors on the
retracted article itself nor building directly upon it.
It is possible, however, that these differences arise because industry scientists find it
easier to substitute citations within a field because their work is more applied in nature.30
To investigate this possibility, we have matched the PubMed database with the US patent
data to identify the citations received from patents by published scientific articles.31 Our
working assumption is that papers that are cited by patents are more likely to be later
stage, whereas those that receive no citations from patents are more likely to correspond to
“upstream” research. 10.7% of retracted articles in the “Absent Shoulders” subsample were
ever cited in a patent (Table 2), while 8.7% of their related articles and 8.3% of the nearest
neighbor controls were ever cited in a patent (Table 3).
We use these data to examine whether the citation patterns of academic and industrial
papers also depend on the “upstream” or “downstream” character of the research itself
(i.e., whether it is specifically cited in a patent). We observe no difference in the case of the
retracted articles themselves (Table 9, Columns 1c and 1d.) However, the distinction between
upstream and downstream research matters for the rate of citations to related papers. In
particular, academic citations to retraction-related articles experience a negligible decline if
the related paper was ever cited in a patent (Column 2c, sum of the coefficients), but the
effect remains strongly negative and significant for related papers not cited in a patent. In
30We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
31See Appendix D in Azoulay et al. (2012) for more details on the patent-to-publication
matching process that provides a foundation for the analyses presented in Table 9.
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other words, the differential response noted above is limited to more “upstream” research,
which makes up over 90% of the retraction-related papers in our sample.
In summary, the available data does not enable us to directly evaluate the relative im-
portance of the “learning” and “status” interpretations of the effects we uncover. Viewed
in their entirety, however, our analyses suggest that status concerns play an important role
in explaining the intellectual atrophy of retraction-aﬄicted fields. And if participation in
these fields is curtailed as a result of these concerns, the conjecture that depressed partici-
pation corresponds to underinvestment from a social welfare standpoint is, at the very least,
plausible.
5 Conclusions
This paper constitutes the first investigation of the effect of “false science” on the direction of
scientific progress. Our findings show that scientific misconduct and mistakes, as signaled to
the scientific community through retractions, cause a relative decline in the vitality of neigh-
boring intellectual fields. These spillovers in intellectual space are significant in magnitude
and persistent over time.
Of course, an important limitation of our analytical approach is that, though we can
document that retraction events cause a decrease in the rate of citations to related articles,
we cannot pinpoint exactly where the missing citations go, or more precisely, in which direc-
tion scientists choose to redirect their inquiries after the event. Nonetheless, the empirical
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evaluation has a number of interesting implications. Through the coding scheme we have de-
veloped to understand the particular circumstance of each retraction event, we highlight the
limitations of the institutional practices that are supposed to ensure the fidelity of scientific
knowledge. In particular, the analysis brings systematic evidence to bear on the heightened
attention devoted to the topic of scientific misconduct in science policy circles. Some ana-
lysts suggest that the scientific reward system has been corrupted and is in need of wholesale,
radical reform (Fang et al. 2012). This view points to the increase in detected frauds and
errors as a strong indication that much invalid science goes undetected. Acknowledging
this possibility, others retort that a system of retractions is precisely what the “Republic of
Science” requires: a mechanism that swiftly identifies false science and effectively commu-
nicates its implications for follow-on research (Furman et al. 2012a). The validity of the
more optimistic view hinges crucially on what is signaled by a retraction notice and on how
scientists in the affected fields process this information and act upon it. Our results suggest
that retractions do have the desired effect on the particular paper in question, but also lead
to spillover effects onto the surrounding intellectual fields, which become less vibrant.
If these negative spillovers simply reflected the diminished scientific potential of the af-
fected fields, then the “collateral damage” induced by retractions would not be a cause for
concern and would reinforce the belief that the retraction process is a relatively effective way
to police the scientific commons (Furman et al. 2012a). However, our evidence indicates that
broad perceptions of legitimacy are an important driver of the direction of scientific inquiry.
Unfortunately, retraction notices often obfuscate the underlying reason for retraction, which
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diminishes the information content of the signal they provide to follow-on researchers. As a
result, there could be high returns to developing a standardized coding approach for retrac-
tions that journals and scientific societies could draw upon to help the scientific community
update their beliefs regarding the nature and scope of false science. While journal editors
may understandably balk at the suggestion that it is incumbent upon them to make clear
determinations regarding the underlying causes of retractions, a clearly-articulated schema
would increase the incentives of authors to report problems emerging after the publication
of an article and provide a more nuanced context within which universities themselves (as
well as funding bodies) might investigate and adjudicate instances of false science.32
A second issue raised by our paper relates to our understanding of what constitutes an
intellectual field. As we noted in the introduction, economists have devoted considerably
more time and attention to the study of the rate of inventive activity than to its direction.
This gap has arisen in part because of the empirical challenges associated with delineating
the boundaries among intellectual fields. Our approach relaxes the data constraint through
the systematic use of keyword information. The same approach could also prove itself useful
to explore more generally the ways in which researchers, through their publications, choose
positions in intellectual space, and change these positions over time. At the same time,
32Alternative mechanisms — such as “replication rings” — have been proposed to counter-
act the negative spillovers in intellectual space associated with retraction events (Kahneman
2012). Whether “local” responses of this type can be implemented successfully is question-
able, in light of the costs they would impose on researchers active in retraction-affected
fields.
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economists’ conceptual grasp of intellectual landscapes remains in its infancy, with a near
exclusive focus on vertical “research lines” (cf. Aghion et al. 2008). We hope that our
empirical results will prove useful to economists seeking to understand movement across
research lines and the consequences of these movements for cumulative knowledge production
and, ultimately, economic growth.
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Table 1: Reasons for Retractions 
 All Cases 
“Strong Shoulders” 
Subsample 
“Shaky Shoulders” 
Subsample 
“Absent Shoulders” 
Subsample 
Plagiarism 90 8.15% 78 38.61% 11 3.81% 1 0.17% 
Duplicated Publication 92 8.33% 90 44.55% 2 0.69% 0 0.00% 
Publisher Error 13 1.18% 8 3.96% 5 1.73% 0 0.00% 
Faulty/Absent IRB Approval 9 0.82% 5 2.48% 4 1.38% 0 0.00% 
Not Enough Information To Classify 42 3.80% 0 0.54% 36 12.46% 6 1.05% 
Questions About Validity 35 3.17% 0 0.00% 31 10.73% 4 0.68% 
Author Dispute 33 2.99% 5 2.48% 28 9.69% 0 0.00% 
Miscellaneous 24 2.17% 15 7.43% 8 2.77% 1 0.17% 
Did Not Maintain Proper Records 3 0.27% 0 0.00% 3 1.04% 0 0.00% 
Fake Data 361 32.70% 0 0.00% 14 4.84% 347 58.91% 
Error/Mistake 271 24.55% 1 0.50% 62 21.45% 208 35.31% 
Could Not Replicate 92 8.33% 0 0.00% 78 26.99% 14 2.38% 
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Fake Data & Plagiarism 15 1.36% 0 0.00% 7 2.45% 8 1.36% 
Missing 24 2.17% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Total 1,104 100.00% 202 100.00% 289 100.00% 589 100.00% 
Note: Retraction reasons for a set of 1,104 original articles indexed by PubMed, published between 1973 and 2008, and 
retracted before the end of 2009. This sample is further broken down into three subsamples. The “strong shoulders” 
subsample comprises 202 articles retracted for typically innocuous reasons, or at least reasons that do not cast doubt on 
the veracity of the results contained therein. The “shaky shoulders” subsample comprises 289 retracted articles for which 
either the retraction notice or information retrievable on the world-wide web cast some doubt on the extent the results 
should be built upon by follow-on researchers. Finally, the “absent shoulders” subsample contains 589 retracted articles 
that will be the source sample for the bulk of the analysis. For these cases, we could ascertain with substantial certainty 
that the results are not to be relied upon for future research. This can occur because of intentional misconduct on the part 
of the researchers involved, or because of mistakes on their part. The comprehensive spreadsheet listing of these retracted 
articles – complete with the references used to code retraction reasons – can be downloaded at 
http://jkrieger.scripts.mit.edu/retractions/. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for 589 Retracted Source Articles 
[“Absent Shoulders” Subsample] 
 Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. 
Publ. Year for Retracted Article 1997.606 2000 7.848 1973 2007 
Retraction Year 2000.844 2004 7.821 1977 2009 
Retraction Speed (years) 3.238 2 2.893 0 16 
Nb. of Related Articles 59.205 43 64.021 1 627 
Part of a Multiple Retractions Case 0.625 1 0.485 0 1 
Intentional Deception 0.611 1 0.488 0 1 
Uncertain Intent 0.081 0 0.274 0 1 
No Sign of Intentional Deception 0.307 0 0.462 0 1 
Part of a Multiple Retractions Fraud Case 0.458 0 0.499 0 1 
Cumulative Citations [as of 7/2012] 45.100 21 70.493 0 728 
US-based Reprint Author 0.533 1 0.499 0 1 
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Article Ever Cited in a Patent 0.107 0 0.309 0 1 
Note: These 589 retractions can be grouped into 334 distinct cases – a case arises because a researcher, 
or set of researchers, retracts several papers for related reasons, e.g., because of repeated fraud. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Related Articles and “Nearest-Neighbor” Controls 
[“Absent Shoulders” Subsample] 
  Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
NN Controls 
(N=65,461) 
Article Publication Year 1999.110 2001 6.994 1970 2008 
Number of Authors 5.148 5 2.959 1 78 
Article Age at time of Retraction 3.987 4 2.425 1 10 
Published After Retracted Article 0.301 0 0.459 0 1 
Baseline Stock of Cites 12.203 4 35.836 0 3064 
Baseline Stock of Cites from Private Firms 1.174 0 3.844 0 230 
Cites Retracted Piece (N=19,299) 0.001 0 0.031 0 1 
Cited by Retracted Piece (N=33,370) 
Article Ever Cited in a Patent 
0.001 
0.083 
0 
0 
0.028 
0.275 
0 
0 
1 
1 
Related Articles 
(N=32,699) 
Article Publication Year 1999.244 2001 6.959 1970 2008 
Number of Authors 5.122 5 2.715 1 50 
Article Age at time of Retraction 3.961 4 2.419 1 10 
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Published After Retracted Article 0.300 0 0.458 0 1 
Baseline Stock of Cites 13.891 4 38.660 0 3713 
Baseline Stock of Cites from Private Firms 1.280 0 4.217 0 368 
Cites Retracted Piece (N=9,737) 0.079 0 0.270 0 1 
Cited by Retracted Piece (N=16,927) 0.061 0 0.240 0 1 
 Article Ever Cited in a Patent 0.087 0 0.281 0 1  
Note: The set of related articles is composed of journal articles linked to the 589 retracted articles of Table 2 through 
PubMed’s “related articles” algorithm (see Figure 1) and downloaded using the open source FindRelated software 
[http://www.stellman-greene.com/FindRelated/]. We exclude from the raw data (i) articles that do not contain original 
research, e.g., reviews, comments, editorials, letters; (ii) articles published outside of a time window running from ten 
years before the retraction event to one year before the retraction event; (iii) articles that appear in journals indexed by 
PubMed but not indexed by Thompson-Reuters’ Web of Science; (iv) articles that we fail to match to Web of Science; (v) 
articles that we do match to Web of Science, but receive zero forward citations (exclusive of self-citations) from their 
publication year up until the end of 2011; and (vi) articles for which at least one author also appears on the authorship 
roster of the corresponding retracted article. For each related article, we select as controls its “nearest neighbors” in the 
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same journal and issue – i.e., the articles that immediately precede and/or immediately follow it in the issue. By 
convention, the controls inherit some of the properties of their treated neighbor. 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for the Entry and Funding Samples 
 Article Frequencies [1975-2011] Funding [1975-2007] 
  
Nb. of 
Related 
Articles 
Nb. of 
Closely 
Related 
Articles 
(rank 20 or 
lower) 
Nb. of 
Closely 
Related 
Articles 
(80% score or 
higher) 
 
Nb. of 
Grants 
$ Amounts 
  Mean 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
Std. 
Error 
 Mean 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
Std. 
Error 
Control N=1,076 4.64 7.49 0.31 0.88 0.22 0.55 N=778 1.21 2.43 $5,587,872 $20,433,959 
Retracted N=565 3.99 7.36 0.24 0.80 0.15 0.46 N=411 1.16 2.64 $5,077,185 $16,683,593 
Total N=1,641 4.42 7.45 0.29 0.86 0.20 0.52 N=1,189 1.19 2.50 $5,413,844 $19,239,559 
Note: We compute entry rates into the field surrounding a retracted article (or one of its nearest neighbor) by counting 
the number of PubMed-related articles in a particular year. We measure NIH funding for the same fields by summing the 
grant amounts awarded in a particular year that yields at least one publication over the next three years that is related to 
63 
 
	
				


469
 
!"

##$
%%&'(")"*%%
+
# 
	 
,#
'
	 #%+
either a retracted article or one of their nearest-neighbor controls. The means and standard deviations are computed over 
all observations in the resulting retracted article/year panel dataset (NT=53,451 for related article frequencies; 
NT=42,524 for funding). 
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Table 5: Effects of Retraction on Citations to Retracted Articles, by Retraction Reason 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Entire 
Sample 
Excludes 
Missing 
Rtrct. 
Reasons 
Excludes 
Missing 
Rtrct. 
Reasons 
Further 
Excludes 
“Strong 
Shoulders” 
Retractions 
Only 
earliest 
retraction 
event in 
each case 
After Retraction 
-1.171** -1.172** -0.472** -1.080** -1.081** 
(0.099) (0.100) (0.099) (0.104) (0.066) 
After Retraction × Shaky Shoulders 
  -0.609**   
  (0.141)   
After Retraction × Absent Shoulders 
  -0.809** -0.199  
  (0.152) (0.157)  
     
Nb. of Retraction Cases 720 705 705 551 552 
Nb. of Retracted/Control Articles 2,959 2,915 2,915 2,431 1,570 
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Nb. of Article-Year Obs. 39,469 38,925 38,925 34,735 20,513 
Log Likelihood -62,620 -62,182 -62,054 -57,567 -34,611 
Note: Estimates stem from conditional quasi-maximum likelihood Poisson specifications. The dependent 
variable is the total number of forward citations (exclusive of self-citations) received by each retracted 
article (or its nearest neighbor controls) in a particular year. All models incorporate a full suite of calendar 
year effects as well as 31 article age indicator variables (age zero is the omitted category). Exponentiating 
the coefficients and differencing from one yields numbers interpretable as elasticities. For example, the 
estimates in column (1) imply that retracted articles suffer on average a statistically significant (1-exp[-
1.171])=68.99% yearly decrease in the citation rate after the retraction event. 
QML (robust) standard errors in parentheses, clustered around retraction cases. 
†p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. 
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Table 6: Effects of Retractions on Citations to Related Articles, by Retraction Reason 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Entire 
Sample 
Excludes 
Missing 
Rtrct. 
Reasons 
Excludes 
Missing 
Rtrct. 
Reasons 
Further 
Excludes 
“Strong 
Shoulders” 
Retractions 
Only 
earliest 
retraction 
event in 
each case 
After Retraction 
-0.059** -0.059** 0.040 -0.085** -0.038* 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.030) (0.030) (0.016) 
After Retraction × Shaky Shoulders 
  -0.131**   
  (0.044)   
After Retraction × Absent Shoulders 
  -0.104** 0.028  
  (0.037) (0.038)  
Nb. of Retraction Cases 770 747 747 573 572 
Nb. of Source Articles 1,104 1,080 1,080 878 580 
Nb. of Related/Control Articles 169,741 167,306 167,306 137,969 90,167 
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Nb. of Article-Year Obs. 2,094,725 2,064,465 2,064,465 1,800,425 1,066,306 
Log Likelihood -2,747,714 -2,714,047 -2,713,760 -2,398,154 -1,457,463 
Note: Estimates stem from conditional quasi-maximum likelihood Poisson specifications. The dependent 
variable is the total number of forward citations (exclusive of self-citations) received by each related article 
in a particular year. All models incorporate a full suite of calendar year effects as well as 31 article age 
indicator variables (age zero is the omitted category). Exponentiating the coefficients and differencing from 
one yields numbers interpretable as elasticities. For example, the estimates in column (1) imply that related 
articles suffer on average a statistically significant (1-exp[-0.059])=5.73% yearly decrease in the citation rate 
after the retraction event. 
QML (robust) standard errors in parentheses, clustered around retraction cases. 
†p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. 
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Table 7: Exploring Heterogeneity in the Magnitude of the Retraction Effect 
‘‘Absent Shoulders’’ Subsample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
After Retraction -0.040* -0.035† -0.010 -0.019 -0.076** 0.016 
 (0.021) (0.019) (0.029) (0.024) (0.018) (0.039) 
After Retraction × Highly Cited Source -0.043      
 (0.035)      
After Retraction × “Hot Field”  -0.121**     
  (0.042)     
After Retraction × “Crowded Field”   -0.105**    
   (0.036)    
After Retraction × Cites Retracted Piece    -0.141*   
    (0.057)   
After Retraction × Cited by Retracted 
Piece 
    0.135*  
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     (0.054)  
After Retraction × Uncertain Intent      -0.099 
      (0.065) 
After Retraction × Intentional Deception      -0.097* 
      (0.046) 
Nb. of Retraction Cases 334 334 334 204 324 334 
Nb. of Source Articles 589 589 589 384 550 589 
Nb. of Related/Control Articles 96,541 96,541 96,541 29,036 50,297 98,160 
Nb. of Article-Year Obs. 1,240,107 1,240,107 1,240,107 329,451 706,932 1,261,713 
Log Likelihood -
1,670,555 
-
1,670,316 
-
1,670,250 
-431,661 -963,226 -
1,686,298 
Note: Estimates stem from conditional quasi-maximum likelihood Poisson specifications. The dependent variable is the 
total number of forward citations (exclusive 
of self-citations) received by each related article in a particular year. All models incorporate a full suite of calendar year 
effects as well as 31 article age indicator variables (age zero is the omitted category). Exponentiating the coefficients and 
differencing from one yields numbers interpretable as elasticities. For example, the estimates in column (1) imply that 
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related articles suffer on average a statistically significant (1-exp[-0.040])=3.92% yearly decrease in the citation rate after 
the retraction event. 
 
Highly cited source articles are retracted papers that are in the top quartile of the citation distribution (assessed at the 
time of retraction). We define the retracted paper’s field as the set of related papers identified by PubMed’s PMRA 
algorithm. We measure recent activity in a field by computing the fraction of papers in that field published in the three 
year period leading up to the retraction event. We denote a field as ‘‘hot’’ if it belongs to the top quartile of this measure. 
We measure ‘‘crowdedness’’ in a field using the relatedness score of the twenty fifth highest ranking related paper that was 
published in or before the retraction year. In the rare cases where the field has less than 25 papers published in or before 
the retraction year, then score of the highest ranked (i.e., least related) paper in the set is used. We denote a field as 
‘‘crowded’’ if it belongs to the top quartile of this measure. We derive the Uncertain Intent and Intentional Deception 
codes from retraction notices and publically available information about the retraction event (see section II of the online 
appendix). 
 
QML (robust) standard errors in parentheses, clustered around retraction cases. † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Table 8: Effect of Retraction on Publication Frequency and NIH Funding 
 (1) 
 
 
Nb. of  
Related 
Articles 
(2a) 
 
Nb. of  
Closely 
Related 
Articles 
(80% score or 
higher) 
 
(2b) 
 
Nb. of  
Closely 
Related 
Articles 
(rank 10 or 
lower) 
(3a) 
 
Nb. of 
Related 
Articles 
Published in 
High Journal 
Impact 
Factor 
Journals 
(3b) 
 
Nb. of 
Related 
Articles 
Published in 
Low Journal 
Impact 
Factor 
Journals 
(4a) 
 
 
Nb. of 
Grants 
(4b) 
 
 
 
$ 
Amounts 
 
After Retraction -0.309** -0.433** -0.271† -0.333** -0.240** -1.152** -1.363** 
 (0.096) (0.166) (0.141) (0.115) (0.092) (0.110) (0.145) 
Nb. of Retraction Cases 333 333 333 333 333 332 332 
Nb. of Treating/Control Articles 1,644 1,511 1,626 1,633 1,644 1,513 1,513 
Nb. of Article-Year Obs. 53,854 49,521 53,264 53,453 53,854 43,159 43,159 
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Log Likelihood -188,980 -30,028 -26,628 -121,006 -112,071 -54,399 -273,467 
Note: Estimates stem from conditional quasi-maximum likelihood Poisson specifications. The dependent variable is the total 
number of related articles published in a particular source/year (columns 1a, 2a, 2b, 3a and 3b), as well as the number or total 
dollar amount of NIH funding awarded in a particular year that yields at least one publication over the next three years that 
is related to either a retracted article or one of their nearest-neighbor controls (columns 4a, and 4b). The high Journal Impact 
Factor (JIF) category includes journals in the top quartile of JIF (indexed by ISI), while the low JIF category includes 
journals from the lower three quartiles. All models incorporate a full suite of calendar year effects. 
QML (robust) standard errors in parentheses, clustered around retraction cases. 
†p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. 
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Table 9: Interpreting Citation Behavior for Articled Related to “Absent Shoulders” 
Retractions 
   Retracted Papers Related Papers  
 (1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) 
         
 Academ
ic 
Citation
s 
Only 
Private-
Firms 
Citation
s 
Only 
Academ
ic 
Citation
s 
Only 
Private-
Firms 
Citation
s 
Only 
Academ
ic 
Citation
s 
Only 
Private-
Firms 
Citation
s 
Only 
Academ
ic 
Citation
s 
Only 
Private-
Firms 
Citation
s 
Only 
After Retraction 
 
After Retraction × Retracted Paper Cited in 
Patent 
 
-1.293** -1.309** -1.304** -1.283** -0.054** -0.006 -0.071** -0.005 
(0.154) (0.188) (0.180) (0.236) (0.017) (0.023) (0.017) (0.025) 
  
 
 
0.041 
(0.178) 
 
-0.086 
(0.328) 
 
   
 
0.066† 
 
 
-0.000 
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After Retraction × Related Paper Cited in 
Patent 
   (0.038) (0.045) 
Nb. of Retraction Cases 
Nb. of Source Articles 
304 304 304 304 334 334 334 334 
1,089 1,089 1,089 1,089 589 589 82,819 53,357 
Nb. of Related/Control Articles     62,205 62,205 96,373 61,806 
Nb. of Article-Year Obs. 15,711 15,711 
15,711 15,711 
807,203 807,203 
1,238,11
8 
801,709 
Log Likelihood -30,568 -8,234 
-30,568 -8,234 -
1,366,13
6 
-402,337 
-
1,756,28
6 
-400,178 
Note: Estimates stem from conditional quasi-maximum likelihood Poisson specifications. The dependent variable is the total 
number of forward citations (exclusive of self-citations) received by each related article in a particular year. All models 
incorporate a full suite of year effects as well as 31 article age indicator variables (age zero is the omitted category). 
Exponentiating the coefficients and differencing from one yields numbers interpretable as elasticities. 
In columns (2a) and (2b), the estimation sample is limited to those related articles and controls that receive at least one “private 
firm” citation between their year of publication and 2011. For this analysis, a citation is said to emanate from a private firm 
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when at least one address listed by the Web of Science includes a suffix such as Inc., Corp., LLC, Ltd., GmbH, etc.  
QML (robust) standard errors in parentheses, clustered around retraction cases. 
†p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. 
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Figure 1: Cumulative Citations at Baseline for Related Articles and their 
“Nearest-Neighbor” Controls 
 
Note: We compute the cumulative number of citations, up to the year that immediately 
precedes the year of retraction, between 32,699 treated (i.e., related) articles and 65,461 
control articles in the “absent shoulders” subsample. 
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Figure 2: Post-Retraction Period Scatterplot of Changes in Citation Rates for 
Related Articles and their Associated Retracted Articles 
 
Note: The figure explores the relationship between the post-retraction citation “penalty” 
suffered by retracted articles and the average change in citation experienced by the set 
of articles that are related in intellectual space to the retracted articles. The post-
retraction period refers to the years between the year of retraction and 2011 (using a 
two-year fixed window instead of this variable window yields very comparable results). 
The citation changes are computed by forming the difference in the logs of one plus the 
number of citations received by each article up until the beginning and the end of the 
post-retraction window, respectively. The slope of the retraction line is about 0.1, i.e., 
for every ten citations “lost” by a retracted articles, related articles suffer a penalty of 
about one citation. 
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Figure 3: Dynamics of the Retraction Effect on Forward Citation Rates 
 
Note: The solid line in the above plot correspond to coefficient estimates stemming from 
conditional fixed effects quasi-maximum likelihood Poisson specifications in which the 
citation rates for related articles and their controls are regressed onto year effects, 
article age indicator variables, as well as 20 interaction terms between treatment status 
and the number of years before/elapsed since the retraction event (the indicator variable 
for treatment status interacted with the year of retraction itself is omitted). The 95% 
confidence interval (corresponding to robust standard errors, clustered around case 
codes) around these estimates is plotted with dashed lines. 
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 Figure 4: Interaction between the Post-Retraction Treatment Effect and 
Relatedness Rank as per PubMed’s “Related Article” Algorithm 
 
 
Note: The circles in the above plot correspond to coefficient estimates stemming from 
conditional fixed effects QML Poisson specifications in which the citation rates for 
related articles and their controls are regressed onto year effects, article age indicator 
variables, as well as interaction terms between the treatment effect and indicator 
variables for the relatedness ranking btw. the related article and its associated retraction 
(as per PubMed’s “Related Articles” algorithm). Each circle correspond to five 
consecutive ranks (e.g., Top 5, Top 6-10, etc.) with all articles receiving a rank above 
one hundred grouped together in the same bin. The 95% confidence interval 
(corresponding to robust standard errors, clustered around case codes) are denoted by 
the vertical bars and their caps. 
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 Figure 5 
Field-level Dynamics 
 
A. Article Frequency B. NIH Funding 
  
Notes: The solid lines in the above plot correspond to coefficient estimates stemming from conditional fixed effects quasi-
maximum likelihood Poisson specifications in which the number of related publications (Panel A) and NIH funding 
in millions of 2007 dollars (Panel B) associated with a particular source article are regressed onto year effects as well 
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as 20 interaction terms between treatment status and the number of years before/elapsed since the retraction event 
(the indicator variable for treatment status interacted with the year of retraction itself is omitted). The 95% 
confidence interval (corresponding to robust standard errors, clustered around retraction cases) around these 
estimates is plotted with dashed lines; Figure 5A corresponds to a dynamic version of the specification in column 
(1a) of Table 8, while Figure 5B corresponds to a dynamic version of the specification in column (2b) in the same 
table. 
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